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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Louise Mann, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE 
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1 
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20050955 - CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
RESPONSE TO FACTS STATED BY APPELLEES 
Ms. Mann's opening brief does not merely reargue her position at trial, but 
rather includes those facts relevant to the issues presented before this Court. The 
facts which the Appellees allege are merely a renewal of Ms. Mann's trial 
argument are included only to the extent necessary to conform to the decision 
made by Judge Himonas in his denial of Ms. Mann's Motion for a New Trial. 
Any perceived defect in Ms. Mann's attempt to marshal the facts was 
inadvertent, as it was her intent to limit the facts to those relevant to the narrow 
issues before this Court. Mann's inclusion of information which "hardly could be 
a factual statement construed in a light most favorable to Appellees" was 
necessary in order to support the theory which formed the basis of Judge 
Himonas' decision. (See Appellees' Brief, pp. 6-7.) Throughout his brief, 
Fredrickson ignores the theory adopted by the trial court which was used to uphold 
the verdict. Rather than merely adopt Fredrickson's account of the accident in 
order to uphold the verdict, Judge Himonas based his decision on the facts asserted 
by Fredrickson plus a selectively removed portion of the testimony of Ms. Mann. 
(See R. 575, pp. 1-2). Ms. Mann included her full statement from which Judge 
Himonas selected an isolated portion to form his opinion. 
Ms. Mann maintains the same position adopted by Judge Himonas; that 
being that Frederickson's account of the accident does not support the verdict. 
Mann believes his account, standing alone, contradicts the verdict. Ms. Mann 
would willingly adopt the Appellees' version of the facts so long as they are 
complete. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and her motion for a new trial because there was no 
evidence to support the finding that Ms. Mann was 100% at fault for the accident, 
as concluded by the jury. The trial court erred in its reliance upon isolated and 
contradictory facts as the sole basis for denying Appellant's motion for a new trial. 
Ms. Mann has complied with the requirements imposed by the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, and properly presents the issues raised before this Court 
pursuant to actions taken in conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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The issue of insufficiency of the evidence is sufficiently preserved by Ms. Mann's 
Motion for a New Trial presented to the trial court. 
The trial court erred in the giving of Jury Instruction No. 28, as it was 
confusing and misleading to the jury, and was not supported by sufficient evidence 
to serve as the defendants' theory of the case. 
DISCUSSION 
I. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
The record below is free from any evidence that would support a verdict 
apportioning 100% of the liability of the subject accident to Ms. Mann. The 
verdict rendered by the jury was entirely inconsistent with the evidence presented 
at trial, and the decisions of the trial court should accordingly be reversed. 
Fredrickson attacks the Appellant's marshalling of the facts, asserting that 
she failed to do so as required under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Fredrickson makes no reference in the argument portion of his brief to any 
specific facts omitted by Ms. Mann, but merely claims she re-argued her position 
at trial and failed to meet her burden. There are some references to additional 
facts which Fredrickson feels are relevant in his response to the facts asserted by 
Mann in her opening brief. 
Appellees note that Mann fails to include the fact that Fredrickson was two 
to three car lengths behind her, had been following her for five or six blocks and 
that she was never aware of his following her despite traveling 10 miles per hour 
in a posted 45 mile per hour zone. (See Appellees' Brief at pp .6-7.) Fredrickson 
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erroneously asserts that Mann failed to mention the fact that Officer Brown was 
unaware of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-69(2) (See Appellees' Brief at p. 8); Mann 
made specific reference to this fact in her marshaling of the facts. (See 
Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 9.) Fredrickson criticizes Mann's inclusion of the 
fact that she "made a normal stop, and had stopped for 10 or 15 seconds before 
Mr. Fredrickson's vehicle struck her from behind[,]" arguing that this can in no 
way be construed in a light favorable to the Appellees. (See Appellees' Brief at 
pp. 6-7). This statement was not included to reargue the matter, but was included 
because this statement was relied upon by Judge Himonas in his decision finding 
that the evidence at trial supported the verdict. (R. 575, pp. 1-2). 
Fredrickson fails to address or recognize the findings articulated by Judge 
Himonas throughout his brief. Judge Himonas examined the record and because 
the evidence clearly fails to support the verdict below, he chose to incorporate a 
selected a portion of the above statement made by Ms. Mann and combine it with 
Fredrickson's assertion that she slammed on her brakes. Id. Only after pairing 
together these isolated, dissected bits of information, gleaned from the record of a 
five-day trial, did Judge Himonas find that the verdict was supported by sufficient 
evidence. It is worth noting that this theory was entirely created by the trial court, 
and was not suggested as a plausible theory by either party before the trial court. 
The Appellant has found it difficult if not impossible to compile evidence 
which supports the verdict apportioning 100% of the fault to Ms. Mann and 
completely exonerating Fredrickson. In an effort to ensure fulfillment of the 
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duty to marshal the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Ms. Mann 
will incorporate those facts which Fredrickson implies were wrongfully omitted, 
and will demonstrate that there is simply insufficient evidence to justify a verdict 
allocating 100% of the liability to Ms. Mann. The following is a recitation of the 
facts relevant to liability marshaled as much as possible to support the verdict: 
• On the day of the incident Fredrickson and Mann were traveling 
north along Redwood Road in a construction area. (R. 574, p. 14.) 
Fredrickson, who was followed by four or five other vehicles, 
followed Mann for approximately five or six blocks. (R. 574, pp. 15-
16.) Fredrickson entered the construction area, slowed down and 
continued to follow Mann when she suddenly stopped in the middle 
of the road such that Fredrickson did not have enough time to stop. 
(R. 574, p. 16.) 
• At no time before the accident did Fredrickson recall taking his eyes 
off of Mann's vehicle. (R. 574, p. 83.) Fredrickson stated that he 
had no warning that Mann was going to stop, and tried to stop by 
slamming on his brakes; this caused his truck to fishtail and he 
collided with the back of Mann's vehicle at an angle. (R. 574, p. 16.) 
Fredrickson stated that at the time of the accident he was very 
surprised that Mann stopped suddenly, and could see no reason why 
she stopped. (R. 574, p. 17.) Mann stated that she did not see 
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Fredrickson's truck behind her prior to the accident and could not 
estimate the impact speed. (R. 573, pp. 73-74.) 
• Officer Matt Brown performed the investigation on the scene of the 
accident and testified that the accident occurred in the middle of the 
road. (R. 573, pp. 34, 41.) While Officer Brown's report did 
mention that Fredrickson's vehicle was traveling too fast and too 
close, he testified that he was not aware of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-
69(2), prohibiting unlawful sudden stops. (R. 573, pp. 35, 43.) 
The above recitation substantially mirrors those facts set forth by 
Fredrickson in his brief and Mann believes the facts above are insufficient to 
uphold the jury's allocation of 100% of liability to Ms. Mann. Without any 
reference to Ms. Mann's version of the facts1, and based solely on the information 
provided by Fredrickson there is no evidence which justifies the jury's 
apportioning 100% of the liability to Ms. Mann. The verdict completely absolves 
Fredrickson from any negligence, despite the duty imposed on following cars by 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-62(1). Additionally, while Fredrickson contends that there 
were as many as five vehicles following the furniture truck he was driving, he 
offers no reason why he was the only one unable to control his vehicle in response 
to the sudden stop made by Ms. Mann, as the collision involved no other vehicles. 
1
 Mann asserted that she was traveling through a construction zone, made a normal, controlled stop 
responding to instructions from a flagger controlling traffic, and after being stopped for 10-15 seconds was 
struck from behind by Fredrickson's vehicle. (R.573, pp. 18-19.) 
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Absent from the facts as set forth by Fredrickson is the fact that while 
Fredrickson at the time of the accident "saw no reason why [Mann] would have 
made such a sudden stop;" (R. 574, p. 17), he stated that once he got out of the 
truck, he then "first noticed there was a flagger standing approximately 20 feet 
from the scene of the accident." (R. 574, p. 19.) Fredrickson makes multiple 
references to Mann's lack of justification for her stop in his brief (see Appellees' 
Brief at 23-25), completely disregarding the fact that there was an individual 
controlling traffic, whom he did not see until after the accident. The statement and 
sketch submitted by Fredrickson as Trial Exhibit 11 (attached here as Addendum 
A) makes reference to an individual controlling traffic, again, an individual 
Fredrickson was not aware of until after the accident occurred. 
While Mann is required to marshal the facts in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, ignoring clearly relevant facts proffered by the opposing party 
overstates and goes beyond that duty. 
Further, the trial court had all of the evidence before them in ruling on Ms. 
Mann's Motion for a New Trial. Due to the lack of evidence to support the verdict 
in Fredrickson's account alone, the trial judge found that his testimony coupled 
with a portion of what Fredrickson refers to as Ms. Mann's "mutually exclusive 
theory" together were needed to justify the verdict. (R. 575, pp. 1-2.) In arriving 
at this conclusion, the trial court interpreted Ms. Mann's statement that she had 
been stopped for 10-15 seconds prior to the impact to mean that she was aware of 
the flagger controlling traffic for 10-15 seconds and then slammed on her brakes at 
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the last moment. Id. This theory was created and invented by the trial court sua 
sponte. Frankly, even were this interpretation a valid representation of the facts, 
Fredrickson had a duty not only to be paying attention to the car in front of him, 
but to surrounding circumstances and especially to an individual controlling traffic 
in a construction zone. It was Fredrickson's own testimony that he did not see the 
flagger until after exiting his large truck after the accident occurred. (R. 574, p. 
19.) The jury's verdict did not merely split liability or attribute the larger portion 
thereof to Ms. Mann, rather, the jury found her to be 100% responsible, and 
completely exonerated Fredrickson. This simply makes no sense based upon the 
evidence presented. Accordingly, Ms. Mann respectfully recommends to this 
Court that the rulings of the trial court should be reversed in the interest of justice. 
IL THE ISSUE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT AND SHOULD BE HEARD 
AND DECIDED 
While the Appellant did not move for a directed verdict during the trial in 
this matter, it is clearly appropriately presented the issue of insufficiency of the 
evidence to this Court. Following the return of the jury's verdict, Ms. Mann did 
move for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which was denied. The trial 
court conceded that the denial of Mann's motion was made without reasoning or 
justification. (R. 575, p. 4.) Fredrickson did not object to the raising of the motion 
at that time, but does so for the first time here on appeal. Generally, "failure to 
raise the point below precludes its consideration [on appeal]." State v. Carter, 707 
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P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985). Having failed to object on these grounds below, 
Fredrickson may not raise this contention here. 
Further, this argument by Fredrickson is misplaced. While the general rule 
precludes a party who failed to move for a directed verdict from moving for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and appellate review, "an exception exists 
where plain error appears in the record and would result in a miscarriage of 
justice." Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975). The lack of evidence 
supporting the jury's allocation of 100% of the liability in this matter to Ms. 
Mann, and the failure of the trial court to grant the Appellant's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict results in a miscarriage of justice, and this 
issue should be considered by this Court. 
Fredrickson contends that the entire issue of "insufficiency of the evidence" 
should be barred by Ms. Mann's failure to move for directed verdict. The above 
noted general rule and exception apply only to those motions as brought under 
Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to move for directed verdict 
is not a procedural bar for a motion for a new trial brought pursuant to Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Fredrickson cites to Brigham v. Moon Lake 
Elec. Ass 'n., 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970) as support for the assertion that failure to 
move for directed verdict precludes the issue of sufficiency of the evidence from 
appellate review. Commentary directly following those excerpts relied upon by 
Fredrickson demonstrates that his position overstates the rule and ignores the 
distinction between Rule 50 and Rule 59. The Brigham court stated: 
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"In case a party desires to challenge the verdict of a jury upon the ground 
that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, he must do so by a motion 
for a new trial, unless during the trial he raised the legal question involved 
by a motion for a nonsuit or for a directed verdict. Unless he has presented 
either a motion for a nonsuit or for a directed verdict, the trial court has had 
no opportunity to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence during the 
trial, and cannot do so unless a motion for a new trial upon the ground of 
the insufficiency of the evidence is presented to it." Brigham 470 P.2d at 
397. 
Contrary to the theory advanced by Fredrickson, that failure to move for 
directed verdict forecloses further review of the sufficiency of the evidence, 
Brigham stands for the premise that the role of the appellate court is to review the 
actions of the court below, and that the issue of sufficiency of the evidence must 
be presented and ruled on by the trial court in order for this Court to review the 
matter. Id. This is accomplished either through a motion for directed verdict or 
through a motion for a new trial on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. 
The issue of insufficiency of the evidence to uphold the verdict has been 
appropriately raised by Ms. Mann based upon the lower court's rulings on the 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the ruling on the motion for a 
new trial due to insufficiency of the evidence. Ms. Mann alleges that the trial 
court's failure to grant these motions constituted error, as the evidence is legally 
insufficient to uphold the verdict attributing 100% of the fault to Ms. Mann and 
completely absolving Fredrickson of any negligence. Accordingly, the issue of 
insufficiency of the evidence is appropriately before this Court. 
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III. MS. MANN HAS RAISED THE APPROPRIATE ISSUES TO 
CHALLENGE THE JURY VERDICT 
Fredrickson argues that Mann failed to preserve the issue of proximate 
cause as rendered by the jury. This argument is erroneous and unnecessary. The 
jury's answer to the first question (the defendants' negligence) posed by the 
special verdict form dictated the answer to the second question (whether 
defendants' negligence proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries). Fredrickson 
asserts that a reviewing court cannot go behind the answers of the jury to special 
interrogatories and analyze or speculate as to the process by which the jury arrived 
at them. Weber Basin v. Nelson, 358 P.2d 81 (Utah 1960). There is no analysis 
involved in the review of the answers to the special verdict form completed by the 
jury. 
Here, the question of the defendants' negligence served as a threshold 
inquiry, a positive answer required further action and a completely negative 
response to this initial interrogatory essentially ended the inquiry. The judgment 
on the verdict summarizes the answers to the interrogatories, and shows how no 
analysis is necessary by the court to understand the jury's response to the question 
regarding proximate cause. (See Judgment on the Verdict, attached hereto as 
Addendum B). 
The first question stated: "Were the Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson 
and Riddle Services, Inc., negligent as alleged by Plaintiff?" The answer was 
"No." The second question stated: "Was Defendants' negligence a proximate 
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cause of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff?" The answer here, "No." Having 
answered the first question in the negative, the inquiry ended; having determined 
no negligence on the part of the Defendants, the jury's answer to the remaining 
questions was predetermined, it is nonsensical to make a finding that 0 negligence 
proximately caused the injuries. 
Ms. Mann maintains that the jury's answer to the initial inquiry is 
inconsistent with and wholly unsupported by the evidence at trial. Based upon the 
manner in which the jury was presented with the questions on the special verdict 
form, the challenge to the jury's verdict regarding the threshold question of 
liability is sufficient, and encompasses a challenge to the proximate cause verdict, 
and can only be cured by the reversal of the lower court's rulings. 
IV, JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 28 WAS IMPROPERLY GIVEN, 
AS IT WAS CONFUSING, MISLEADING AND NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SERVE AS 
DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF THE CASE. 
The trial court erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 28. In addition to the 
insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, the Appellant, respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse the lower court's determinations, and order the district court 
to set aside the verdict, vacate the judgment and grant a new trial based on the fact 
that Jury Instruction number 28 was misleading, confusing, and unsupported by 
the evidence. 
To require a new trial on the basis of an improper jury instruction, it must 
be shown that the erroneous instruction "was prejudicial, i.e., that it tend[ed] to 
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mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or 
erroneously advise[d] the jury on the law." Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 
UT App 239. As Appellant's counsel argued, Instruction 28 was misleading and 
confusing to the extent that it was prejudicial to the Ms. Mann; it affected her 
substantial rights, was inconsistent with substantial justice, and justified the 
granting of a new trial. 
A. Mann Properly Objected to Jury Instruction No. 28. 
Ms. Mann took timely exception to Instruction 28 at trial, giving the trial 
court notice that the instruction was confusing, misleading, inappropriate to the 
situation, and contrary to testimony. (R. 593, p.444). In order to appeal the giving 
or refusal of an instruction, Utah law requires a party to object, and distinctly 
state the matter to which he/she objects and specifically state the grounds for that 
objection. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 40 P.3d 1119, 1123. The 
objection made by counsel for Ms. Mann was specific enough to inform the trial 
court of the error in the instruction to the above standards established under Utah 
law. Mann raised her concern with the subject instruction on multiple occasions, 
and did so with the requisite degree of specificity. 
~ Rule 51(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure establishes protocol for objecting to jury instructions, and 
states that "In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party shall identify the matter to which the 
objection is made and the grounds for the objection." 
13 
B. Jury Instruction No. 28 Was Misleading to the Jury and Was 
Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence to Serve as Defendants' 
Theory of the Case. 
Ms. Mann has not contended that Jury Instruction No. 28 was an 
improper statement of the law, but that it was inappropriate for the jury in this 
action. Mann agrees fully that Fredrickson was entitled to an instruction on his 
theory of the case. Under Utah law "all parties are entitled to have their theories of 
the case submitted to the jury in the court's instructions, provided there is 
competent evidence to support them." Pernios v. Covenant Transportation Inc., 
2004 UT App. 35, 86 P.3d 752, (citing Newsome v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc., 119 
P.2d 692, 694 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)(emphasis added). 
Ms. Mann's contention is that Instruction number 28 was unsupported by 
the evidence; was confusing and misleading to the jurors, and improperly 
influenced the jury to her detriment. The jury was left to speculate and consider 
facts outside of the evidence presented to arrive at their verdict. 
Instruction No. 28 contains multiple elements that create a duty, which 
any leading driver would presumably owe to following vehicles. These elements 
create a limited rather than generalized duty, one restricted to a set of 
circumstances not proven in the present case. One of the essential elements of the 
statute and corresponding instruction is the opportunity to give a signal. 
Fredrickson presented no evidence at trial that Ms. Mann had an opportunity to 
give a signal, and that, given this opportunity to signal, she failed to do so. Since 
no evidence was presented to support this essential element, Fredrickson did not 
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offer competent evidence to support this instruction as his theory of the case and 
the instruction should not have been given. See Paulos, supra. 
There is an appropriate time for the giving of an instruction like the one at 
issue here, but there was insufficient evidentiary basis for it in this matter. The 
administering of this misleading instruction, which was unsupported by the 
evidence was confusing to the jury, was prejudicial to the Appellant, and resulted 
in a verdict which was inconsistent with and contrary to the evidence. 
Accordingly, the submission to the jury of Instruction No. 28 was not harmless 
error and therefore Ms. Mann should be granted the relief sought on these 
grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
Fredrickson attempts to complicate the issues and burden this Court with 
arguments beyond the scope of those presented. In addition, Fredrickson does not 
address or even acknowledge the unorthodox manner in which the trial court 
upheld the verdict in denying Ms. Mann's Motion for a New Trial. There is no 
evidence to support a verdict allocating 100% of the fault to Ms. Mann and 0% to 
Mr. Fredrickson. The jury's verdict is unreasonable and unjust as it is entirely 
inconsistent with the evidence presented. While the trial court demonstrated 
sophisticated reasoning and creativity in forming its ruling on the Appellant's 
Motion for a New Trial, Ms. Mann maintains that the court's dissecting and 
contorting her testimony and combining it with that of Fredrickson to "salvage" a 
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verdict unsupported by the evidence are actions which should not be condoned by 
this Court. 
Based upon the foregoing grounds, Ms. Mann respectfully requests this 
court to reverse the rulings below, and to issue an order instructing the trial court 
to set aside the verdict, vacate the corresponding judgment and grant the 
Appellant's motion for a new trial. 
^ DATED this fl' day of May, 2006. 
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM R. RAMJNGS 
William R. Railings 
Attorney fop/Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT was hand delivered this prf day of May, 2006, to the 
following: 
Albert W. Gray 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
7351 South Union Park Ave. #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84047 
ADDENDUM A 
Draw a diagram of how the collision occurred. Please use an arrow to indicate North. 
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Describe how the collision occurred (include direction of travel, drivers intent, road 
conditions, and type of traffic control). 
f--;\!a«:>>\<) C^s r. rtc-i?^ ^ i 
^7H;Vi &stJ<iy far/ZSityL, 4~f~«-
S^QPf 
Signature Witness to signature 
READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING. 1 hereby 
Certify that all statements made in this witness statement 
Are done voluntarily and are true and J understand and 
Agree that any false statement will be prosecuted to the 
Fuli extent of the law. 
ADDENDUM B 
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Third Judicial District™— 
Richard K. Glauser, #4324 JUN 2 4 2005 
Albert W. Gray, #A6095
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C I W I I T U p <~i A i i e c D D <~ SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. By. A Professional Corporation Deputy cierk 
7351 S. Union Park Ave., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 562-5555 
Attorneys for Defendant Fredrickson and Riddle Services, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE MANN, 
Plaintiff, 
SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE 
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1 
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
Civil No. 030916997 
Judge Robert W. Adkins 
The above-entitled matter was tried beginning June 6,2005, and continuing through 
June 10,2005, before the Honorable Robert W. Adkins of the Third Judicial District Court. 
A jury was duly empaneled. The Plaintiff, Louise Mann, appeared in person and through 
her counsel, William R. Rawlings. The Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson and Riddle 
Services, Inc., appeared in person and through their personal representatives respectively 
and through their counsel, Albert W. Gray, of the law firm of Smith & Glauser, P.C. 
Evidence was produced by each of the parties through testimony and exhibits on both 
liability and damage issues. 
At the conclusion of Plaintiffs evidence, Plaintiff rested. 
Defendants moved for Directed Verdict, pursuant to Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure on the issues of liability, personal property claims, future medical expenses, and 
future loss of household services. 
Plaintiff indicated that no claim was being presented for damages to personal 
property. The Court entered Directed Verdict in favor of Defendants on this issue. The 
Court denied Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict on the remaining issues. 
Defendants then presented evidence in support of their defense to Plaintiffs claims. 
At the conclusion of Defendants* presentation of evidence, Defendants rested. 
The Court instructed the jury on the law applicable to the issues raised by the 
pleadings. 
The Court then submitted the issues to the jury on a Special Verdict. The jury, 
having retired to consider the matter, and after deliberations, returned a Special Verdict as 
follows: 
1. Were the Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson and Riddle Services, Inc., 
negligent as alleged by Plaintiff? 
ANSWER: No. 
2. Was Defendants' negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by 
the Plaintiff? 
ANSWER: No. 
3. Was the Plaintiff contributory negligent, as alleged by the Defendants? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
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4. Was the Plaintiffs negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
DATED this 10th day of June, 2005. 
/s/ Frank Christiansen, Foreperson 
Plaintiff requested that the jury be polled. In response to Special Verdict 
Interrogatory Number 1, at least six of the jurors indicated that they had answered "No" as 
to whether the Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson and Riddle Services, Inc., were 
negligent as alleged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff requested that the jury be polled in response to 
Interrogatory Number 2, was Defendants1 negligence a proximate cause of the injuries 
sustained by the Plaintiff, but then abandoned the request after the second juror 
responded. 
Based upon the Special Jury Verdict: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Judgment be entered 
in favor of Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson and Riddle Services, Inc., as a "No Cause." 
THE COURT notes that Defendants filed an Offer of Judgment in the amount of 
$100,000 on December 17, 2004, and the Defendants, by virtue of the No Cause and the 
Offer of Judgment, are entitled to their taxable costs from the inception of the case to be 
established upon submission of affidavits of the attorneys of Plaintiff and Defendants to 
obtain such costs submitted to the Court for approval. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant is awarded 
his taxable costs, to be established pursuant to Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
3 
be established upon submission of an affidavit of Defendants' attorney establishing such 
costs, submitted to the Court for approval. 
DATED this J J j day of June, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Honorable Robert W. Adkins 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be sent via facsimile transmission and mailed, 
postage prepaid, this /ff1^ day of June, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT to the following: 
William R. Rawlings, Esq. (Fax: 495-2122) 
LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS 
11576 South State St, #401 
Draper, UT 84020 
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